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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ELMER HANKS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Vs.

CASE NO.
9190

MARK CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For many years prior to 1958 the plaintiff
and defendant owned large tracts of land in South
Utah County.
The land of the plaintiff was used primarily
for cattle grazing, and the land of the defendant was
used for sheep grazing. On the 18th day of October,
19'58, the defendant intentionally kindled a number of
fires on his land between 8:00 o'clock a. m. and 10:00
O'clock a. m. (Tr. 386, 1. 19-25) "These fires were
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set approximately 75 feet from the plaintiff's property line (Tr. 386, 1. 29) in an area where the
defendant had not cleaned out the firebreak between
the plaintiff's and defendant's property. (Tr. 429,
1. 11-25) The range conditions were extremely dry
and the leaves, brush and weeds in the area and in
the firebreak were very dry. Afterletting the fires
burn most of the day, the defendant and his wife returned to check the fires around 4:00 o'clock p. m.
the afternoon of October 18, 1958, and they found
the fire had spread to an area of approximately one
acre. (Tr. 432, 1. 26-30; Tr. 433, 1. 1-9) The
defendant and his wife fought the fire which was then
out of control for approximately one hour until 5:00
o'clock p. m. on October 18, 1958, and then the defendant and his wife left for help. (Tr., 433, 1.
11-20) When the defendant and his wife began fighting the fire around 4:00 o'clock p. m. there was
very little wind. (Tr. 436, 1. 29) The defendant
claims that "unusual and freak winds unexpectedly
came up approximately ten hours after said fire
was commenced up to approximately 85 miles per
hour, which caused said fires to get out of control.
That such conduct on the part of Mother Nature was
an act of God and not foreseeable by the defendant
and that the damages were caused through no fault
of this defendant and were caused by instrumentalities not under the control of the defendant. " (Defendant's Third Defense, par. 6) There is no
evidence in the record that there was any unusual
or freak winds in the vicinity of the fire until after
9:00 o'clock p. m. on October 18, 1958.

~
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Fire fighting equipment arrived on the scene
around 7:30 p. m. and around 9:00 p. m. the wind
started blowing hard and the fire burned approximately·''3b0 to 400 acres of the plaintiff's ground, destroyed or damaged approximately 510 cedar posts
and burned considerable barbed wire.. (Tr. 369, 1.
12-30; Tr. 370, 1. 1-13)
Considerable damage was done to plaintiff's
property by bulldozers brought in by the fire warden
and the county to control the fire.
After the fire, the plaintiff and the defendant
talked about the damage which the plaintiff had sustained and the defendant claimed a contract was
made whereby the defendant was to do certain acts
to compensate plaintiff for his damage. The plaintiff denies a contract was made. The parties were
unable to resolve their differences or arrive at the
fair measure of damages to be paid by defendant to
plaintiff and the plaintiff filed his complaint. The
case was tried before a jury. The jury was given
special interrogatories on questions of fact. The
jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial and
both of these motions were denied.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY~O THE
CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
PR)CR
POINT II
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
INFORMING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OF ITS
ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO INSTRUCTING THE
JURY, AND
(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY TO
TAKE EXCEPTIONS TO, OR TO OBJECT TO
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHERE
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE IN WRITING, PRIOR
TO THE INSTRUCTIONS BEING GIVEN TO THE
JURY, AND
(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO OBJECT, OR TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE JURY RETIRING
TO CONSIDER ITS VERDICT.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT NEGLIGENCE IN TffiS
CASE IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND
REASONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY
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CARE" WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE
USED IN THIS CASE.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL
WIND AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND
IF AN UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH,WIND
AROSE DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND
CARRIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AND THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN TO
THE JURY, BECAUSE THE INTERROGATORIES
AS SUBMITTED COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE
COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING
COUNSEL FOR PLA1NTIFF TO SUBMIT PROPOSED
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY PRIOR TO THE CON·
CLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
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There is an "unwritten rule" in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, which is often imposed by
the trial judge which requires plaintiff's attorney
to submit plaintiff's proposed instructions to the
Court prior to the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
This rule was imposed in this particular case and
plaintiff's attorney was required to submit proposed written instructions prior to the completion
of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff submits this rule is
arbitrary, not reasonable, and in this particular
case, highly prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff. Plaintiff recognizes the power and discretion
of the trial court under the first sentence of Rule
51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as
follows:
"At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the Court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests."
However, in this case, because of the rambling,
no theory, type of pleadings filed by the defendant, it was impossible to prepare instructions
covering defendant's theory of the case until defendant's case had been presented subject to
plaintiff's objections.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in
the case of State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 v. 416, 25 p 2d 612, held that it

-for
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is proper and generally necessary for the Court
in its instructions to the jury to present the case
of the plaintiff and defendant and that whatever
theories are presented by the pleadings or otherwise, in order to be submitted to the jury by way
of instruction, must be supported by some evidence,
since instructions must be responsive to issues and
of such a nature that they are applicable to the evidence received and submitted to the jury. This being
the case, it is unreasonable, arbitrary and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff to require him to
submit proposed instructions to the jury prior to the
completion of his own case and certainly prejudicial,
arbitrary and unreasonable to require proposed instructions prior to defendant's evidence being presented.
POINT II
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT INFORMING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OF ITS
ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S -REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO INSTRUCTING THE JURY,
AND·
(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY TO TAKE
EXCEPTIONS TO, OR TO OBJECT TO THE COURT'S
INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHERE TIE INSTRUCTIONS
WERE IN WRITING, PRIOR TO THE INSTRUCTIONS
BEING GIVEN TO THE JURY, AND
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(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO OBJECT, OR TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE JURY RETIRING
TO CONSIDER ITS VERDICT.
In this particular case, the Court failed to
give plaintiff's attorney any notice of its action
upon plaintiff's requested instructions prior to
ins true ting the jury, and plaintiff's attorney was
not furnished with a copy of the Court's ins truetions until after the Court was giving its instructions to the jury. Plaintiff's attorney requested
the Court reporter to get a copy of the instructions
for plaintiff's attorney, which he did, but while the
Court was already in the process of instructing
the jury.
There is also an "unwritten rule" in the
Fourth Judicial District Courts that attorneys
will not be permitted to take exceptions to the
Court's instructions until after the jury has retired to consider its verdict.
In this particular case. plaintiff's attorney
had no opportunity to make objection, or take exception to the Court's instructions prior to the
Court giving the instructions because plaintiff's
attorney never saw the Court's instruction until
the Court commenced its instructions to the jury.
To have objected at that time (while the Court
waa in the process of instructing the jury) and to

-8-
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have dismissed the jury and to have permitted
plaintiff's attorney to take exception to the Court's
instructions, and then to have recalled the jury
and started over with re-instruction of the jury,
would have certainly prejudiced the plaintiff's
case, since the hour was late and the jury had already been subjected to a lengthy trial.
Rule 46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows-:
"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the Court are unnecessary. It
is sufficient that a party, at the time
the ruling or order of the court is made
or sought, makes known to the court
the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the
court and his grounds therefor; and, if
a party has no opportunity to object to
a ruling or order at the time it is made,
the absence of an objection does not
thereafter prejudice him. "
Under the circumstances, plaintiff's attorney
did not object or stop the proceedings of the Court
in instructing the jury, because to have done so,
at the time, wruld have prejudiced the plaintiff's
position.
Rule 51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
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"At the close of the evidence or at
such earlier time during the trial
as the court reasonably directs,
any party may file written requests
that 'the court instruct the jury on the
law as set forth in said requests.
The Court shall inform counsel of
its proposed action upon the requests
prior to ins true ting the jury; and it
shall furnish counsel with a copy of
its proposed ins true tions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally, or otherwise
waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing,
all objections thereto must be made
before the instructions are given to
the jury; otherwise, objections may
be made to the instructions after
they are given to the jury, but before
the jury retires to consider its verdict.
No party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the
grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement,
the appellate court, in its discretion
and in the interests of justice, may

*
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review the giving or failure to give an
instruction. Opportunity shall be given
to make objections, and they shall be
:t.nade, out of the hearing of the jury.
"Arguments for the respective parties
shall be made after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall
not comment on the evidence in the
case, and if the court states any of
the evidence, it must instruct the
jury that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact. 11
*Underlining added.
Under this rule plaintiff's attorney is entitled to take exceptions or object to the court's
instructions "before they jury retires to consider
its verdict." However, this is seldom, if ever,
permitted under the Fourth District Court's
"unwritten rule. 11
In this case, plaintiff's attorney was not
permitted to take exceptions to, or object to the
trial court's instructions until after the jury had
retired to deliberate upon a verdict. (Tr. 467,
1. 17-22)
Conduct of this type by the trial court was
clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, prejudicial, and
contrary to the above stated rule.

-11-
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 'iliA T NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE

IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY CARE"
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN
THIS CASE.
The defendant's conduct and duty in this case
is subject to the statutory restrictions imposed by
sections 24-1-1 through 24-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, since the defendant's land was in a
state designated fire control district. (Tr. 418, 1.
1-19)
W"here the statute, ordinance or permit lays
.down a reasonable rule of conduct specifically designed for safety of persons or property, violation
proximately resulting in injury ccnstitutes negligence per se.
Where an act of God unites or co-mingles with
negligence as an efficient and concurring proximate
cause and injury or damage would not have occurred
except for negligence, the person negligent should
be held liable.
The controlling case on this point is Bushnell,
et al v. Telluride Power Co. 145 Federal 2d 950. In
this Utah case the plaintiff recovered damages for
defendant negligently starting a fire under conditions
and facts very similar to those in this particular case.
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In the Telluride Fbwer case the court found that

starting a fire without a permit alone constituted
negligence, and where there is a controlling statute establishing a different standard of care,. the
court should not give instructions on "reasonablet'
or''ordinary care.''
Considering the extremely dry weather conditions and the fact that the firebreaks in the area
where defendant started his fires were full of dry
1eaves , ( T r. 9, 1 • 2 3- 3 0 ; T r. 1 0, 1 . 1 - 21 ) and
considering the fact that the defendant was totally disabled one hundred per cent (Tr. 372, 1.
17-19; Tr. 428, 1. 15-26) and considering the
fact that the defendant was only to burn fires upon his p:toperty subject to the restrictions set
forth in the fire permit (see fire permit exhibit)
and since the defendant did not comply with the
providions of the fire permit, and was not equipped either physically himself or with proper fire
fighting equipment to fight a fire of any consequence, (Tr. 428, 1. 15-30; Tr. 429, 1. 1-25)
and considering the fact that the defendant was in
the habit of leaving his fires unattended all day,
and even overnight (Tr. 429, 1. 29-30; Tr. 430,
1. 1- 6), the court erred in giving instructions
Numbers 4, 5, 9, and 10, all dealing with. reasonable or ordinary care. The defendant was
guilty of negligence per se, on the basis of all
the evidence, and the covrt should have so instructed the jury.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL WIND AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE
FIRE AND IF AN UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED
HIGH WIND AROSE DURING THE PROGRESS OF
THE FIRE AND CARRIED TIE FIRE WHERE IT
WOULD NOT HAVE OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH
WIND CONSTITUTES AN INTERVENING CAUSE
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AND THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED TIEREBY.
There is no evidence in the record to indicate
that there was any unusual or unexpected high winds
at the time the defendant and his wife went for the
fire department, and at that time the fire was clearly out of control, because of the negligence of the
defendant. (Tr. 443, 1. 11-23; Tr. 462, 1.1-24)
The defendant and his wife both admit there was very
little wind as does the defendant's witness Albert
Peterson, who arrived at the scene of the fire at
approximately 7:30 p. m. (Tr. 369, 1. 16-30; Tr.
370, 1. 1-13) Under the law as established in the
Telluride Power case, where an act of God unites
or co-mingles with negligence as an efficient and
concurring proximate cause and injury or damage
would not have occurred except for negligence,
the person negligent should be held liable, and the
court sb.auld have so instructed the jury.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN TO
THE JURY, BECAUSE THE INTERROGATORIES
AS SUBMITTED COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE
COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.
From what has already been pointed out, and
the law applicable to points Nos. 3 and 4, it is clear
the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct
the jury, in failing to give plaintiff's requested instructions, particularly plaintiff's instruction No. 13.
The trial court having erred in the instructions also
erred when it gave special interrogatories based upon erroneous instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
Leon M. Frazier, for
FRAZIER AND JUDD
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant, Elmer Hanks
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